Richard Bellman's Principle of Optimality, formulated in 1957, is the heart of dynamic programming, the mathematical discipline which studies the optimal solution of multi-period decision problems. In this paper, we look at the main trading principles of Jesse Livermore, the legendary stock operator whose method was published in 1923, from a Bellman point of view.
Introduction
In his 1923 book Reminiscences of a Stock Operator, the legendary trader Jesse Livermore gave a detailed account of his trading methods. In this paper, we study some of Jesse's trading rules, and we show that many of them directly reflect in Bellman's Principle of Optimality. Thus, in their strive for optimality, two of the greatest minds of the 20th century can be found to be neatly aligned.
Richard Bellman's 1957 book on Dynamic Programming introduces his conceptual framework for the solution of multi-stage decision processes. While having multiple different mathematical formulations, the problems studied by Bellman all share the following main characteristics (see [1] , Chapter 3). a) There is a system, characterised at each stage by a set of parameters and state variables. b) At each stage of either process, we have a choice of a number of decisions. c) The effect of a decision is a transformation of the state variables. d) Past history is of no importance in determining future actions. e) The purpose is to maximise a function of the state variables.
In Bellman's words, a "Policy" is any rule for making decisions which yields an allowable sequence of decisions; and an "Optimal Policy" is a policy which maximises a pre-assigned function of the final state variables". For every problem with the above listed properties, Bellman establishes the following rule.
The Principle of Optimality suggests that we study the Q-value matrix describing the value of performing action a in our current state s, and then acting optimally henceforth. In this framework, let Q(s, a) denote the set of values available from current state s through action a; eg, interpret s as the agent's current wealth, and a as a parametrisation of a long or short position (or any other action) he initiates.
The current Optimal Policy and Value Function are given by a ⋆ (s) := arg max a Q(s, a) and V (s) := max a Q(s, a) = Q(s, a ⋆ (s)), respectively. Let s ′ denote the next state of the system, and let r(a, s, s ′ ) be the reward of the next state s ′ given current state s and action a.
We would like to put the just introduced definitions into a sequential context. We will consider the path of a single market where trading takes place at discrete times. Time t = 0 corresponds to the current time. The realised current state will be denoted by s t , the current action by a t , a future unobserved state by S t+1 , and optimal policy and value functions are defined by
respectively.
The Principle of Optimality now provides the key sequential identity of Dynamic Programming, namely that
In Bellman's words: whatever todays state s t , and whatever todays decision a, today's value Q t+1 (s t , a) is based on (expected) optimal decision making with regard to the next state S t+1 which results from today's state s t and decision a.
To find today's optimal action, one has to solve the equilibrium condition (1) for the Q-matrix, and then read off the optimal action a ⋆ (s t ) that attains arg max a Q(s t , a).
For simplicity, we assume that a t ∈ A takes only a finite set of possible values.
However, in reality, there's a caveat: to evaluate (1) in his decision making, as the real world probabilities are unknown to him, the trader has to take expectations under his subjective probability distribution q(S t |s t , a), which describes his beliefs about the future path of state variables depending on his current wealth s t and his action a.
Thus, instead of (1), the trader will attempt to solve
, where E q [·] and V q (·) denote probabilities taken with respect to the distribution q(S t+1 |s t , a) of the trader's beliefs.
Within the Bellman and Livermore optimal framework, we note a number of compelling features, which we summarise in the following remarks. Remark 1.1. It is surprising how little effect the distinction between (1) and (2) has on the actual trading process. Remark 1.2. Rules based on deviations between realised market prices and a trader's expectations have little place in assessing the optimal action a ⋆ : arguments such as " sell because prices went higher than my expectations" do not enter the picture, which is a version of Jesse's maxim that "the market is never wrong" (cf. [3] , p.8). Put simply, we should only worry about the optimal Bellman path of actions, or how we got there, rather to act optimally from here on out. Remark 1.3. A large part of the Bellman and Livermore optimal policy insight is that the traders subjective beliefs (2) must be updated conditionally on observed market prices. Because the market has a superior information set when prices rise, the optimal action is to do nothing -in Jesse's words, "one should hope, not fear" -and when prices fall, one should think of selling -"one should fear, not hope" (cf. [3] , p.11).
We will look at the importance of Remarks 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in more detail in the next section.
Trading Principles
We discuss two of Jesse's main trading rules, hoping to provide a modest insight into his trading principles.
2.1. Profits take care of themselves, losses never do. Suppose there are only two possible market positions, Long and Neutral, denoted by a L and a N , respectively. Short will be the reflection of Long.
Suppose a trader initiates a long position a L at time t because, given his current wealth s t , he observes
But, suppose that, at time t + 1, he finds that r(a, s t , s t+1 ) < 0, and that his new wealth now is S t+1 < s t . Then the trader has to evaluate whether to close his position (ie, action a N ), or whether to hold on to his position (ie, action a L ).
If we assume that the decision whether to be in or out of the market is independent of the current wealth level S t+1 , then arg max a Q q t+2 (S t+1 , a) = arg max a Q q t+2 (s t , a). We observe that, if acting under an unchanged subjective probability
then he trader will proceed with a L , since Q q t+2 (S t+1 , a L ) > Q q t+2 (S t+1 , a N ) as before.
then the trader now supplements his rational (ie, his subjective probability q) by the information contained in the most recent price move x t+1 .
If we denote the trader's updated views by q ∪ {x t+1 }, then, by a symmetry argument, we get that Q q∪{xt+1} t+2
(S t+1 , a N ), where, by assumption, r(a L , s t , S t+1 ) < 0 = r(a N , s t , S t+1 ).
We observe that, in absence of other external information besides the price move x t+1 , and being consistent with his own former rationale, the trader should take a Neutral action and exit his position.
In reality, due to cost of trading, the trader's reaction will not be immediate. However, the implication of the principle of optimality is that the only thing of concern with is Selling the losing position.
The reflection of the above argument, in the case where r(a L , s t , S t+1 ) > 0, shows that next periods optimal action is a L the same as the current period: the winners take care of themselves.
In Jesse's words:
"Profits always take care of themselves, but losses never do. The speculator has to insure himself against considerable losses by taking the first small loss. In doing so, he keeps his account in order, so that, at some future time, when he has a constructive idea, he will be in a position to go into another deal, taking the same amount of stock he had when he was wrong." (cf. [3] , p.13)
We shall now look at a brief example, putting the just introduced concepts into practice.
Example 2.1. Consider a trader Jan, who is investing in Google (GOOG) shares. Suppose Jan's only counter-party is a broker called Charlie 1 .
Suppose Jan has just purchased GOOG shares worth $1000 from Charlie, ie, we have st = $1000. Suppose that Jan trades with Charlie daily, and that, every time he trades, he invests exactly $1000 (independently of his net wealth), taking his profit/loss for the trade on the following day. Suppose further that the daily price movements of the GOOG shares are exactly ±1%, where p and 1 − p are the real-world probabilities for an up or down move, respectively.
Define u := $10 and d := −$10, and denote the decision to take a long (short) position by a L (by a S ). As p is unknown to him, Jan has to make his trading decision based on his personal beliefs 1 > q, 1 − q > 0. According to Jan's own estimate, q > 0.5, and
and, therefore, Jan his very happy with his newly purchased share of GOOG equity.
Suppose in reality p < 0.5, and that, the following day, Jan checks with Charlie, just to find that S t+1 = st − d = $990 and r(a L , st, st − d) = −$10 < 0.
Naturally, Jan is somewhat unimpressed with his results, and he initially blames Charlie. But, Jan has to make a decision: should he increase his holding GOOG equity following a L ?
Jan's personal estimate q > 0.5 is unchanged, so he is tempted to stay long and buy more. However, having carefully read [1, 3] , Jan is also blissfully aware that this would not be in accordance with the optimal Bellman policy -the outcome most consistent with Jan's initial belief would have returned r(a S , st, st + d) = $10 > 0 up to this point. Therefore, realising that increasing his position would inadvertedly deviated from the optimal path, Jan decides to liquidate his position.
Of course, had Jan been profitable with a L , the reverse argument would have held, and he would have kept his GOOG equity, enjoying the ride on the optimal Bellman trajectory (and avoiding any disputes with Charlie).
Don't average down.
Averaging down is the practice of increasing one's position after taking a loss, in the hope of reaping the expected profit and recovering all previous losses.
Strictly speaking, averaging down is already prohibited if losing positions are exited, which we covered in Section 2.1; however, the strategy is so popular that it warrants separate consideration.
Using the notation of Section 2.1, suppose again that, based on (3), our trader holds a long position a L at time t, and that, at time t+1, he finds that r(a L , s t , S t+1 ) < 0, and that his new wealth now is S t+1 < s t . If our trader thinks that an increased long position is in order, then, clearly, he must think that
where q ′ denotes his updated personal probabilities. But, in absence of other external information besides the price move x t+1 , we have q ′ = q ∪ {x t+1 }, and, as already seen in Section 2.1, (3) then implies
which means that (4) cannot be true.
The contradiction between (4) and (5) is an interesting one, and slightly exceeds the implications of Section 2.1. As acting based on q ′ = q t ∪ {x t+1 } leads to (5), we see that averaging down can only ever be justified if the trader believes to have obtained a new set of external information, exceeding what was learned from the latest price move x t+1 , and dominating the price. -A very rare case indeed: generally, doubling up on a losing position is irrational.
"One other point: it is foolhardy to make a second trade, if your first trade shows you a loss. Never average losses. Let that thought be written indelibly upon your mind."(cf. [3] , p.20) "I have warned against averaging losses. That is a most common practice. Great numbers of people will buy a stock, let us say at $50, and two or three days later if they can buy at $47 they are seized with the urge to average down. [...] If one is to apply such an unsound principle, he should keep on averaging by buying 200 shares at $44, then 400 at $41, 800 at $38, 1600 at $35, 3200 at $32, 6400 at $29 and so on. How many speculators could stand such pressure? Yet if the policy is sound it should not be abandoned. Of course, abnormal moves such as the one indicated do not happen often. But it is just such abnormal moves which the speculator must guard against to avoid disaster."(cf. [3] , pp.37-38) "So, at the risk of repetition, let me urge you to avoid averaging down. [...] Why send good money after bad? Keep that good money for another day. Risk it on something more attractive than an obviously losing deal."(cf. [3] , p.38) Remark 2.2. An immediate corollary to Section 2.2 is that trading on the belief of a 'true' value is dangerous. Almost always, the true value is established once, and then convergence is waited for. Adverse movements are interpreted as providing 'better entry points', and are believed to 'strengthen' the opportunity. -Clearly, any such reasoning compounds the conflict between (4) and (5) severalfold, and should be strictly avoided.
Conclusion
There is a saying, attributed to John Kenneth Galbraith, that "faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof." In this paper, we show that, within the Bellman and Livermore optimal policy insight, every view held should be updated conditionally on the latest available information; an unwillingness to learn, as alluded to by Galbraith, is expected to be detrimental.
Joe Fahmy gives a summary [4] of Jesse's principles in his own words. His list, once again, nicely reflects the parallels between the Bellman and Livermore optimal policy insights, and serves as a nice completion to this paper.
(1) Don't trust your own opinion and back your judgment until the action of the market itself confirms your opinion. (2) Markets are never wrong -opinions often are.
(3) The real money made in speculating has been in commitments showing in profit right from the start. (4) As long as a stock is acting right, and the market is right, do not be in a hurry to take profits. (5) The money lost by speculation alone is small compared with the gigantic sums lost by so-called investors who have let their investments ride. (6) Never buy a stock because it has had a big decline from its previous high. (7) Never sell a stock because it seems high-priced. (8) Never average losses. (9) Big movements take time to develop. (10) It is not good to be too curious about all the reasons behind price movements.
Appendix A.
We also observe that a Price Process, denoted by p t (x t ), will also satisfy a Bellman optimality; for risk neutral traders with information set x t and dividends, or rewards, r t+1 (X t+1 ), we have (6) p t (x t ) = max a E p [r t+1 (X t+1 ) + p t+1 (X t+1 )] , where E p [·] denotes expectation with respect to p(S t+1 |s t , a, x t ).
